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Policy reform and farmers’ wheat allocation
in rural China: a case study∗
David Buschena, Vincent Smith and Hua Di†
Market-oriented policy reforms often have important effects on farm-level grain pro-
duction and utilisation decisions in developing countries. China’s grain farmers are of
particular interest because of China’s importance in world grain markets and because
of China’s recent major agricultural policy advances and retrenchments. An empirical
evaluation of market liberalisation among farmers located in two provinces in China on
farm-level wheat consumption, market sales and on-farm storage during 1994 is pre-
sented. The results indicate that policymakers should account for such changes in farm
householdbehaviourindesigningandassessingtheconsequenceofmarketliberalisation
programs for agricultural sectors in developing countries.
Key words: China, grain storage, household allocation decisions,
procurement quotas, wheat.
Shanghai/Singapore, Nov. 21, 2001(Reuters) – ‘If the world’s optimists have their way,
China’s [sic] will throw open its gates to import huge shipments of grains and other
commodities the moment it joins the World Trade Organization on December 10.’ ...
‘Analysts predict December 10 will yield a different reality.’
Beijing, Oct. 9, 2001 (Reuters) – ‘China has begun easing a decades-old system forcing
people to work where they are registered to live, allowing greater freedom of movement
inanincreasinglymarketorientedeconomy.’...‘AnalystssayChinaneedstoallowmore
free movement of labour as it shifts away from less intensive agriculture, ...’
1. Introduction
China has been reforming its grain policy for over two decades (Economic Research
Service 2003). The period 1993–1994 provides a particularly interesting case study of
thesepolicychangesandtheirconsequences,asChina’sgrainpolicyinitiallymovedto-
wards extensive market-oriented reforms, only to return to more extensive government
control of grain procurement within 3 years. The Chinese government made extensive
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changes to grain acquisition policies and market controls during this period.
Mandatory farm-level grain delivery quotas were reduced, private grain markets
liberalised and prices paid by government grain buyers for both quota and over-quota
purchases tied more closely to private market prices. In addition, government price
subsidies for urban consumers were intended to be substantially reduced and urban
market prices to be more closely aligned with procurement costs. In fact, in many re-
gions, government procurement agencies continued to offer low prices for over-quota
purchases (Park and Rozelle 1998). Relieved of most restrictions on sales to private
markets, many farmers increased grain sales to these markets and increased storage in
anticipation of future private market sales. However, these reforms were short-lived. In
late 1994 and 1995, because urban consumers experienced up to 60 per cent increases
in wheat prices, the government responded by rolling back many of the grain market
reforms introduced in 1993. The government of China continues to reform agriculture
in part to meet World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements and also in response
to domestic concerns, but the consequences of these more recent policy adjustments
are yet to be determined.
The quantitative effects of the short-run policy changes in 1993–1994 on farm
householdgrainconsumption,storageandmarketingdecisionshavereceivedrelatively
little attention. However, these effects have important implications for rural household
incomes and nutrition. In addition, given China’s important role as an importer in
worldwheatmarkets,changesinpoliciesthataffectdomesticstorageandconsumption
may have substantial ramiﬁcations for world wheat prices.
Assessments of the impact on Chinese farm-household decisions of these policy re-
formshavebeenhamperedbyadearthofrelevantdata.Thiscasestudyusesfarm-level
cross-section data from 155 farm households from six villages in two wheat producing
regions to estimate the effects of changes in government quota and price policies on
the farm-household level allocation of wheat between on-farm consumption, sales to
the government, private market sales and on-farm storage. This data set was collected
in 1994 under the supervision of researchers from the University of California at Davis
and is highly regarded for its accuracy and representativeness. Numerous papers have
used this data, including: Brandt et al. (2002); Rozelle et al. (1999a,b); Rozelle and Li
(1998); and Li et al. (1998).
The survey data were collected during the spring of 1995 from Hebei and Liaoning
provinces. Heibei has recently produced over 10 per cent of China’s wheat, while
the adjacent province of Liaoning produced less than 1 per cent of China’s wheat
(Lohmar 2004). Many farm households in both provinces have viable off-farm income
opportunities. The survey provides information on farm household behaviour during
1994, the period in which China’s private grain markets were least regulated. The
results of the study, therefore, are of particular interest because parameter estimates of
price effects are less likely to be biased downwards because of unobserved government
restrictions on private market sales.
Thedeterminantsofend-of-yearfarmer-ownedwheatstocksinChinaareofconcern
as those stocks have been estimated to be quite large, amounting in aggregate to
between 85 and 111 per cent of production in the early 1990s (Crook 1996; Food and
Agriculture Organization 2000). Crook has suggested that a number of factors are
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important in determining the levels of stocks held by Chinese farmers. He has argued
that Chinese farmers hold large grain stocks partly because they serve as a form
of lifetime savings (private land ownership and enrolment in state pension plans by
farmersarelimitedinChina).CrookalsohypothesisesthatChinesefarmersholdgrain
stocks because of ﬁnancial and grain market imperfections, government grain price
policy and market restrictions and historically developed farmer attitudes towards
the risk of food shortages. The factors identiﬁed by Crook are generally consistent
with commonly held views that farmers in developing countries such as India and
China hold grain stocks because of convenience yields (Renkow 1990), grain or credit
market imperfections, risk aversion (Saha and Stroud 1994; Johnson and Song 1999),
food security concerns (Ke 1996), as a price hedge (Park 1996) and – as in developed
countries – in anticipation of proﬁts (Gardner 1979).
In this study, we develop an intertemporal theoretical model of wheat use for con-
sumption, market sales and changes in storage by farm households. The model, while
in many respectssimilar to those developed by Saha and Stroud (1994) and also Carter
andZhong(1999),isnovelinthatitaccountsfortheeffectsofChina’sgrainquotapro-
gram on farm household wheat allocation between consumption, storage and market
sales. The predictions of the model are tested using cross-section survey data through
an econometric model of wheat use that accounts for household demographic and
economic characteristics.
The empirical results reported here are largely consistent with the predictions of the
theoretical model and indicate that market prices and government quota policies have
economically important effects on farm consumption, on-farm storage and market
sales. Household wealth and the potential for households to earn off-farm income also
signiﬁcantly affect household wheat use decisions. In addition, the econometric results
are consistent with the implications of Park’s dynamic programming model of market
grain sales by low-income households in China. The empirical results also suggest that
while the policy changes undertaken in 1993 and 1994 increased market sales, para-
doxically they may also have led to increased market prices, which contributed to the
Chinese government’s abandonment of many aspects of its grain market liberalisation
program in 1997.
1.1 Chinese agricultural policy and grain use
Despite the abandonment of collective production teams and restrictions on grain
production by individual households in 1979, the Chinese government continued to
relyonagrainacquisitionanddistributionsysteminthe1980sandtheearly1990sthat
involved a considerable degree of control by the central and provincial governments
(Sicular 1995). Through a government quota procurement system introduced in 1953,
grainproducerswereorderedtodeliverspeciﬁcquantitiesofgraintogovernmentgrain
bureausatrelativelylowﬁxedprices.Thesebureausthendistributedgrainatsubsidised
prices to permanent urban residents.
In the 1960s, an over-quota procurement system was implemented under which,
after meeting the predetermined quotas, producers could sell grain to the government
at a premium over the quota price. Despite some signiﬁcant changes, the core elements
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of this quota-based grain procurement program remained in place during the 1990s.
In the early 1990s, farmers still had to comply with predetermined delivery quotas
to government grain bureaus at prices well below those for over-quota sales either to
government grain bureaus or to private buyers. Turner et al. (1999) report that cash
settlements of quota became increasingly allowed at the village level in the mid-1990s,
with farmers paying the difference between the market price and the quota price for
these settlements.
Over the period 1991–1993, substantial market-oriented reforms were implemented
for grain sales. In some provinces, under these reforms farmers enjoyed reductions
in mandatory delivery quotas for wheat and were also allowed to sell over-quota
production either to government grain bureaus at premium prices or, perhaps more
importantly,intoprivatemarkets.Inaddition,grainpricesubsidiestourbanconsumers
were substantially reduced. In May 1991, for example, retail prices for government-
procured grain increased by 67 per cent (Findlay and Watson 1999) and in 1992 were
supposed to have been further increased to correspond approximately to procurement
prices paid for over-quota grain (Lin 1994).
In late 1994 and in 1995, higher grain prices in urban markets created considerable
political pressures. In response, the government effectively prohibited many farmers
from selling over-quota production into private markets, essentially re-establishing
monopsony powers for regional government grain bureaus. The government grain
acquisitionprogram,putintoeffectin1998duringaperiodoflowworldmarketprices,
had three key elements (Findlay and Watson 1999). First, farmers still had to meet
grain delivery quotas and received lower prices for quota grain. Second, government
grain bureaushad exclusiverightstopurchase all farmer-marketed grain, whileprivate
merchants could only buy grain from these grain bureaus. Third, grain bureaus were
required to pay market prices for any over-quota grain farmers wanted to sell unless
prices fell below predetermined minimum levels; that is, farmers were guaranteed a
minimum price.
In 1999, the Chinese government moved to increase prices for higher quality grain
and to commercialise and allow autonomy for grain bureaus and grain stations
(Lohmar 2004). Many provinces also abandoned the grain quota system, instead
using taxes or cash fees (Lohmar 2004). This shift away from the quota system al-
lowed some farmers to move into more proﬁtable crops such as horticultural products.
China’s hybrid agricultural system continues to evolve as a mix of market forces and
government planning, with this mix being driven by goals of: (i) achieving a high level
of self-sufﬁciency in grain production and (ii) increasing rural incomes (Economic
Research Service 2003).
The period of liberalisation of grain markets in 1993 and 1994 provided China’s
farmers with opportunities to respond to higher private market prices by reallocating
grain between household consumption, storage and private market sales. Reportedly,
although grain and credit markets remained imperfect (Park 1996), farmers responded
to partial market liberalisation by reallocating grain into private markets (Park and
Rozelle 1998; Findlay and Watson 1999). As evidenced by the Chinese government’s
decision to roll back the market liberalisation component of the reforms, the extent to
whichfarmersreallocatedgrainbetweenmarketsalesandotheruseswasunanticipated.
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Inthenext section,we presentan intertemporaltheoreticalmodelof thefarmer’s grain
allocation decision that captures the effects of the key elements of China’s grain policy
in the early 1990s and permits the development of an econometric model to assess the
quantitative importance of these effects.
2. Model
The farmer’s post-harvest decision for allocating wheat between household consump-
tion, storage and market sales is modelled as an intertemporal decision. Following
Saha and Stroud (1994) and also Carter and Zhong (1999), the farm household is
assumed to optimise wheat allocation among competing uses in the context of an
additively separable (in time) utility maximisation model, in which input decisions are
taken to be exogenous and the allocation decision is subject to wheat quantity, quota
and income constraints.
The farm household maximises the discounted present value of expected utility in
two periods, denoted 0 and 1. In period 0, the farm has already harvested its crop, but
the crop harvest in period 1 is unknown. Household utility in each period depends on
household grain consumption, c and the consumption of a numeraire good, y.I ne a c h
period, utility also depends on a vector Ft of measurable family characteristics, where
t identiﬁes the period of interest. Utility in period 1 is deﬁned through the expected
values of c1 and y1 and by a random vector µ that deﬁnes departures from these
expected values as a result of variability in wheat production and prices. The farmer’s
objective function is:
U (c0, y0; F0) +  E [U (c1, y1; F1,...)], (1)
where U(•) is a twice differentiable utility function over wheat consumption and the
numeraire good,   is the discount scalar and E[•] is the expectation operator deﬁned
over the random error vector µ. Variability in production, prices and other factors
can be identiﬁed empirically through observed departures from population averages.
Note that the cross-section survey data do not include any information allowing us to
form reliable estimates of how realised prices, yields and other variables differ from
expectations.
Household income in period 0 is deﬁned as:
y0 = pq0 ∗ ¯ q0 + p f0 ∗ q f0 − k(s0 +  s0) + NW(r0, F0,w 0), (2)
where ¯ q0 is the government procurement quota, q f0 is the quantity of grain sold on
t h ef r e em a r k e t ,pq0 is the price paid for grain under the government quota, p f0 is the
over-quota market price for wheat, s0 is the initial level of storage in period 0 and  s0
is the net addition to household grain storage. Storage costs in period 0 are deﬁned
by the function k (s0 +  s0). Prices are assumed to be known in period 0 but not in
period 1. Thus, income from any given level of wheat sales in period 0 is not stochastic.
The function NW(•) denotes income from sources other than sales of wheat, and is
assumed to depend on the value of other farm production (r0), off-farm income and
family wealth as proxied by the vector of family characteristics in the initial period
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(F0),andthevillagewagelevel(w0).ThevectorF0 includeshouseholdnon-agricultural
wealth and demographic information that reﬂects potential on- and off-farm labour
supply (see de Brauw et al. (2000) and also Giles (2000) for analysis of household
labour patterns in rural China).
The wheat allocation constraint in period 0 can be written as:
c0 = Q0 − q f0 − ¯ q0 −  s0, (3)
where the farm’s wheat output, Q0, is known. The income constraint in period 1 is:
y1 = pq1 ∗ ¯ q1 + p f1 ∗ q f1 + NW (r1, F1,w 1). (4)
Period 1 values of the market price for wheat, the quota price, non-wheat income and
wealth and the quota price and quantity levels are unobserved and enter the period
0 decision through expectations. For any given random harvest level Q1, the wheat
allocation constraint in period 1 is:
c1 = Q1 − q f1 − ¯ q1 + (s0 +  s0). (5)
As only two periods are being modelled, the household does not carry grain stocks
beyond period 1.





H = U (c0, y0; F0) +  E [U (c1, y1; F1,...)], (6)
subject to the constraints in Equations (2), (3), (4) and (5), where x0 ={ q f0, s0}.
Allowingforthepossibilityofcornersolutions,theKuhn–Tuckerﬁrst-orderconditions
for the wheat allocation choice variables yield the following results, where subscripts
indicate partial derivatives:
Hq f0 =− Uc0 + p f0Uy0 ≤ 0, (7a)
and
H s0 =− Uc0 − Uy0 ∗
∂k
∂ s0
+  E [Uc1] ≤ 0, (7b)
where these conditions hold as equalities for interior solutions.
As zero values are observed in the data set for two choice variables, market sales
and on-farm consumption of wheat, the corner solutions are relevant. However, use-
ful insights about the qualitative effects of exogenous variables can be obtained by
examining the properties of interior solutions.
Given an interior solution, Equation (7a) implies that in period 0 the marginal rate
of substitution between grain consumption and the composite good equals the ratio
of the prices of the two commodities and also deﬁnes the marginal opportunity cost




















Figure 1 Production and consumption under quota.
of wheat consumption as p f0Uy0. Equation 7(b) implies that the marginal utility loss
from foregone grain consumption plus the marginal utility loss of income as a result of
storage costs equals the discounted expected marginal utility from grain consumption
in period 1. Optimal consumption in period 0 is determined simultaneously with
optimal market sales and additions to storage through the constraint in Equation (3)
and the ﬁrst-order maximisation conditions, (7a) and (7b). In a reduced form context,
these optimal values depend on grain production, quota levels, wheat market prices,
sources of farm income other than wheat market sales (including quota revenue and
market sales of other farm products), family characteristics, and expectations about
grain production and other stochastic variables in period 1.
Insights about the implications of changes in exogenous variables on the solution
to the farmer’s maximisation problem in period 0 are provided by Figure 1, which
abstracts from changes in stock levels and storage costs for purposes of illustration.
In Figure 1, the production of wheat (c) and the aggregate good (y) in period 0 occur
at point A on the farm’s production possibilities frontier. However, A does not deﬁne
the farmer’s relevant market sales and consumption opportunities. Wheat available
for market sales and consumption is reduced by the farm’s government procurement
quota (which is subject to a mandatory price discount), while the availability of the
composite good is increased by the farm’s quota revenue. Thus, the relevant initial
endowments of wheat and the composite good available to the farm are deﬁned by
B. At B, market prices determine the budget line that deﬁnes the farmer’s consump-
tion opportunity set. Given this opportunity set, the farm household can sell wheat
into private markets (or to government grain bureaus) to achieve the level of welfare
associated with indifference curve U0 at point C. Although, under pure autarky, the
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farm would be able to improve its welfare to indifference curve U1 by operating at a
pointsuchasD,themandatoryquotaprogramprecludesthisoption.PointDindicates
that consumption of the composite good is lower and wheat consumption is higher
under autarky than at Point C. Strictly speaking, this need not be the case given the
income reductions from quota sales.
TheKuhn–Tuckerconditions,(7a)and(7b)providesomeusefulandtestablepredic-
tions about wheat allocation decisions. They imply that, if positive, wheat market sales
are positively related to: (i) the amount of available wheat (production, reduced quota
levels, carry-in stocks); (ii) the amount of other sources of income in period 0; and (iii)
the price of wheat if the ratio of the marginal utilities (Uc0/Uy0) increases with y0.T h e
model’s implications for own-price effects on wheat consumption are complicated by
the commodity’s role as a source of family income and as a store of wealth. Increases
in the price of wheat increase potential farm revenue and therefore could lead to either
increases or decreases in consumption if wheat is a normal good because of offsetting
farm-revenue and substitution effects (a similar result is shown in Carter and Zhong
1999).
Thetwo-periodmodelcanalsobeusedtoobtaininsightsabouttheeffectsofchanges
in expected production, quota level, other farm sources of revenue, the wheat market
price in period 1 and other variables of interest. However, these effects also depend on
thenatureofthefarmhouseholds’riskattitudes.Animportantcaveatfortheestimates
presentedbelowisthattheomissionofexpectedperiod1pricesinempiricalestimation
models may result in a bias in the estimated coefﬁcients.
Provided that wheat is a normal good, wheat consumption in period 0 is predicted
to increase with: (i) larger amounts of available wheat (increased production, reduced
quota levels, increase carry-in stocks) and (ii) increases in other sources of income in
period 0. Increases in the current market price for wheat increase the opportunity cost
of holding stocks, but also increase the farm household’s income available for current
and future consumption. These potentially offsetting price and farm revenue effects
preclude any deﬁnite predictions for the effects of increases in the current market price
on wheat storage.
The ﬁrst-order conditions in Equations 7(a) and 7(b) also provide predictions for
stocks. Additions to wheat stocks are predicted to: (i) increase with available wheat
(production, reduced quota levels, carry-in stocks); (ii) decrease with increases in other
sources of revenue under decreasing absolute risk aversion; and (iii) decrease with
increased storage costs.
3. Data
Cross-section household survey data were collected for crops harvested in 1994 un-
der the direction of researchers at the University of California at Davis in the spring
of 1995. This survey effort is described in detail in Jacoby et al. (2002). More than
200 households were surveyed across six villages in two wheat producing provinces in
north-east China, Heibei and Liaoning, of which 155 provided sufﬁciently complete
responses to be used in the econometric analysis presented here. Both the villages and
the households within those villages included in the survey were randomly selected
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics, data weighted by quality adjusted land area
Variable (n = 155) Mean SD Min Max
Harvested wheat (kg) 1813 1119 350 7000
Government wheat quota (kg) 356 498 16 2974
Wheat market price (yuan/kg) 0.611 0.078 0.372 0.872
Marketable wheat quantity (kg) 1229 721 −62 4035
Wheat stock additions (kg) 134 346 −602 1500
Wheat consumption (kg) 744 362 0 1800
Wheat market sales (kg) 644 1000 0 3500
Carry-in wheat stocks (kg) 398 379 0 2000
Village wage (yuan) 352 67 274 458
Marketable corn quantity (kg) 1893 1170 −170 5850
Total quota revenue (yuan) 210 296 10.8 1736
No. on-farm working age 2.33 1.00 0 5.1
No. off-farm working age 0.200 0.57 0 4.4
No. on-farm non-working age 1.39 1.07 0 4
Education years, household heads’ average 5.17 2.73 0 12
Non-agricultural wealth (yuan) 16830 13918 320 69950
from within the two provinces. These two provinces together produced 9.8 per cent of
China’s total wheat production in 1994 (Fred Gale, Economic Research Service, pers.
comm., 2002). Thus, the farm households can be viewed as providing a representative
sample of production operations within these provinces. The survey recorded current
and crop year-to-date demographic variables, consumption, market sales, quota de-
liveries, current storage, pre-harvest carry-in, prices, borrowing and other variables.
Consumption, market sales and quota fulﬁlment were recorded in the spring, so the
households’ additional crop-year consumption, sales and stock reductions have not
been recorded in the survey.
Descriptive statistics for variables included in the estimated econometric models are
presented in Table 1. To avoid potential heteroscedastic error problems related to land
area, for each household all dependent and independent variables were normalised by
dividing them by the sum of wheat consumption, market wheat sales and additions
to wheat stocks. Thus, the estimates are carried out over shares of consumption, sales
and stock additions. Observations on two households were omitted because, as a result
of stock withdrawals, the measured amount of wheat allocated to the three uses was
non-positive and thus shares could not be computed.
Households were included in the analysis if they had ‘farm resident status’ (i.e.,
householdslivedonthefarm)andalsohadtomeetagovernmentwheat-deliveryquota.
The households included in the sample obtained substantial income from farming, but
somealsohadconsiderableoff-farmincome.Aftermeetingmandatorydeliveryquotas,
manyfarmerswithinthesampleretainedsubstantialquantitiesofwheatforhousehold
consumption or market sales.
Among the farms in the sample, average total harvested wheat production was over
1800 kg and ranged from about 350 to 7000 kg/household. On average, 19 per cent of
wheat available to farm households was used to meet quota requirements, 40 per cent
was consumed by the household, 32 per cent was sold into private markets, 2 per cent
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wassoldtogovernmentgrainbuyersthroughnegotiatedsalesand7percentwasadded
to storage. The average amount of over-quota wheat available per farm included in the
sample was 1229 kg (approximately 45 bushels), ranging from a minimum of a 62 kg
deﬁcit (approximately 2.3 bushels) to a maximum of a 4035 kg surplus (approximately
148 bushels). Government procurement quotas varied substantially among farms,
ranging from a minimum of 16 kg to a maximum of 2974 kg. Evaluations of survey
information and discussions with academic experts on Chinese agriculture indicated
that on a per hectare basis quota differences depended primarily, but not exclusively,
on expected total yield differences.
The post-harvest wheat allocation decision is affected by factors that are effectively
exogenous in the short run, including crop yield in the current period (which is known
prior to the allocation decision), carry-in wheat stocks, the government delivery quota,
predetermined quota revenue, wheat market prices, the village wage, family character-
isticsandameasureofnon-agriculturalhouseholdwealth(valueofconsumerdurables
plus the value of the family’s house). Diagnostic tests of regression errors provided no
evidence of a statistically important relationship between regression errors for shares
of wheat allocation and these explanatory variables, even at very high P-values (e.g.,
35%). The separation of household income into revenue from wheat marketing, quota
revenue and income from other sources permits an explicit empirical evaluation of the
effects of exogenous (non-wheat) sources of income on wheat consumption, sales and
storage. In this regard, the empirical analysis presented below differs from those of
Carter and Zhong (1999) and Saha and Stroud (1994), who aggregate income from all
sources.
The quantity of wheat available to farmers in period 0 after satisfying the quota
requirements is deﬁned as ‘marketable wheat’ (the difference between harvested wheat
and the sum of the farm’s delivery quota, seed use and wheat swaps). Wheat carry-in
stocks are included as a separate explanatory variable to delineate between the effects
of new production and carry-in stocks on current period wheat allocation decisions.
Note that storage facilities in many areas of China are quite limited (Crook 1996) and
thus grain quality issues may arise if stocks are held over for long periods of time.
Wheat swaps are aggregate non-market gifts and exchanges between family mem-
bers, neighbours or other parties with social ties. The exact ties were not included in
the survey data. Because variables explaining these swaps were not available, the em-
pirical analysis does not account for them. We also estimated the model using separate
variables for the quota and available wheat. There were few important differences in
the estimates.
Awheatpricevariablewasconstructedtomeasuretherelevantpricesfacedbyfarm-
ers. In addition, reported farm-level sales prices reﬂect seasonality, quality differences,
differences in each farmer’s negotiating ability and differences in market opportunities
across villages. In markets in which storage provides an effective means of intertem-
poral arbitrage, seasonal differences in prices reﬂect differences in the opportunity
costs of marketing grain (Williams and Wright 1991). Thus, in these circumstances,
observed seasonal price differences should not be included in reported price measures.
In contrast, price differences arising from differences in quality, negotiating ability and
location effects across villages should be included. To remove seasonal effects, prices
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received by each farmer reporting market or negotiated grain sales were detrended
using a linear time trend. If farmers have multiple sales during the marketing year then
the value of the price variable is deﬁned as a weighted average by the quantity of the
detrended prices for these sales.
These detrended prices should still reﬂect variations in quality premiums, gains
associated with negotiating ability and village market opportunities. Village averages
of detrended prices are used as proxies for market prices faced by farmers who had no
reported grain sales. Among the 155 households included in the econometric analysis,
58 reported market sales of wheat to private buyers, 15 reported negotiated sales of
wheat to government grain buyers (three of which also had sales to private buyers),
and 82 reported no market sales. Negotiated sales occur at relatively high detrended
prices, suggesting that to some degree government grain buyers had to compete for
grain on the basis of the price in 1994.
Other sources of farm income are deﬁned to include quota revenues from govern-
ment purchases of both wheat and corn (the two major grains in this survey area)
and the quantity of the farm’s marketable corn. The marketable quantity of corn
is used as an indicator for both the income potential from corn sales or livestock
feeding and potential effects on wheat storage costs (because corn stocks compete
with wheat stocks for storage space). Off-farm earnings are also important sources
of income for many of the households in the sample and on average are almost
four times higher than revenues from corn and wheat sales. Instruments are there-
fore included to account for each household’s potential for off-farm earnings to avoid
a potential errors-in-variables problem associated with using off-farm earnings as
an explanatory variable. Four demographic variables included in the survey are re-
lated to the potential for off-farm earnings, farm labour and consumption: (i) the
number of family members of working age (between 13 and 60) living on the farm;
(ii) the average wage level within the village, calculated as the mean wage for survey
respondents working within a village; (iii) the number of family members of working
age living off the farm (not more than 9 months) who can provide income remittances
to the farm; and (iv) the household head’s average educational level. Another variable,
the number of family members of non-working age (under 13 or over 60) living on the
farm, is included to account for differences in on-farm wheat consumption.
Household wealth is also a potentially important determinant of farm household
decisions (e.g., de Brauw et al. 2000). Chinese farmers could not own land in 1994 and
rural ﬁnancial markets were underdeveloped, so consumer durables and housing may
provide relevant measures for wealth other than that held in agricultural commodities.
Here,wecombinereportedvaluesofeachfarmfamily’sconsumerdurablesandhousing
to obtain a proxy for non-agricultural wealth.
Marketable wheat represents the post-harvest quantity of wheat available for con-
sumption, storage and market sales allocations. On some farms, reported harvested
wheat production was not sufﬁcient to cover quota, seed and swaps and thus the quan-
tity of marketable wheat was negative. In these circumstances, farms met their quota
obligations and consumption needs from carry-in stocks, through market purchases
or through swaps. Carry-in stocks were reported to be large and on average equalled
one-ﬁfth of the household’s current year’s harvest.
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It should be noted that the theoretical model and the structure of the survey data
mean that the empirical estimates presented in the next section should be interpreted
as short-run responses. Given the policy rollbacks of 1995, farmers would have been
rational to treat the policy reforms as being of a short-term nature. Clearly, the cross-
sectionnatureofthesurveydataprecludestheestimationofwheatsupplyresponse.
4. Estimation procedures
Two important considerations complicate the empirical modelling of Chinese farmer’s
grain allocation decisions. First, over half (54%) of the farm households had no re-
ported market or negotiated wheat sales, a prima facie corner solution. Observations
of no market sales are common in many developing countries such as China where the
transition to market-based exchange is incomplete. We do not discount the potential
for unreported sales in China but are unable to identify them in this data set. Second,
the on-farm allocation of grain between consumption, market sales and additions to
stocks involves a simultaneous set of decisions. The equations are estimated simul-
taneously in share form, requiring one equation to be omitted. Omitting the market
salesequationfromthesystemaddressesbothempiricalconsiderations.Theaddingup
condition is used for tests of the resulting linear combination of coefﬁcient estimates
from the two-equation system, allowing estimation and tests for the effects of the ex-
planatory variables on the market sales share. Diagnostic tests showed no signiﬁcant
heteroscedasticity or signiﬁcant error-cross correlation within villages.
4.1 Estimation results
Estimation results from the systems estimation are presented in Table 2. An increase
in the availability of marketable wheat statistically signiﬁcantly decreased the share
of wheat allocated to consumption while signiﬁcantly increasing the shares allocated
to stocks and to market sales. Additional unreported results from models in which
the dependent variables are measured in levels indicate that wheat consumption by
Chinese households increased with wheat available for marketing, but at a decreasing
rate.
Larger carry-in stocks from the previous year’s production led to signiﬁcantly in-
creased market sales and decreased additions to stocks. Consumption share signiﬁ-
cantly increased with the price of wheat, a result consistent with the implications of
the theoretical model that substitution and farm revenue effects may be offsetting. The
share of available wheat allocated to stocks signiﬁcantly decreased with higher wheat
prices. As the quantity of marketable corn increased, the share of available wheat al-
located to market sales signiﬁcantly increased while the share allocated to additional
stocks signiﬁcantly decreased, a result consistent with an upward sloping supply curve
of grain storage.
An increase in the number of family members living on the farm signiﬁcantly in-
creased consumption share and decreased the share marketed. Increases in the number
of family members of working age living off the farm (and presumably remitting in-
come)ledtosigniﬁcantreductionsintheshareofadditionalwheatstocksandapparent
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Table 2 Systems regression estimates for wheat allocation, shares (n = 153)†
Consumption Additions to storage Market sales
Variable share share share
Constant 0.595 (4.56)∗∗∗ 0.3518 (2.93) 0.0528 (0.420)
Marketable wheat
quantity
−0.14E−02 (3.83)∗∗∗ 0.7E−03 (2.03)∗∗ 0.7E−03 (1.93)∗
Carry-in wheat
stocks
0.6E−04 (0.219) −0.7E−03 (−2.83)∗∗∗ 0.7E−03 (2.61)∗∗∗
Wheat market price 3.09 (2.36)∗∗ −2.69 (2.23)∗∗ −0.397 (0.314)
Total quota revenue −0.10E−03 (−0.084) −0.1E−02 (−1.27) 0.15E−02 (1.26)
Marketable corn
quantity
−0.88E−04 (−0.412)∗∗∗ −0.7E−03 (−3.34)∗∗∗ 0.7E−03 (3.38)∗∗∗
No. on-farm
working age




0.362 (1.45) −0.66 (−2.86)∗∗∗ 0.294 (1.22)
No. on-farm
non-working age
0.217 (2.46)∗∗ −0.056 (−0.687) −0.161 (1.90)∗




−0.023 (−0.610) 0.035 (1.02) −0.012 (0.341)
Non-agricultural
wealth




signiﬁcance at the 1 per cent level. †t-values are in parentheses.
(though statistically small) increases in consumption and market sales. This off-farm
family member effect is consistent with the argument that off-farm remittances substi-
tute for commodity stocks in managing family risk.
Higher village wages increased consumption shares and also somewhat increased
the share put into stocks (signiﬁcant at the 10% level). This wage effect on stocks at
the margin is consistent with stocks as a store of wealth but is inconsistent with stocks
as a risk-reducing tool. Neither education levels nor the measure of non-agricultural
household wealth used here signiﬁcantly affected wheat allocation shares.
4.2 Policy implications
The empirical results of this case study provide some useful insights about the effects
of China’s wheat policy changes in the early 1990s. They indicate that, holding wheat
production constant, the reduction in grain bureau delivery quotas resulted in the
reallocation of some, but not all, of the wheat released from quota into private mar-
ket sales. The coefﬁcients presented in Table 2 and the descriptive statistics in Table 1
indicatethataquotareductionincreasedthesharesofwheattomarketsalesandtoad-
ditions to stocks, while decreasing the share allocated to farm household consumption
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during this period (although, when quota reduction effects are measured at the sam-
ple means, total on-farm consumption increases). However, these results indicate
that total supplies available to urban and other non-wheat-producing households
may have declined quite substantially in the short-term as a result of the quota
reductions.
To illustrate this quota reduction effect for 1994, consider a 10 per cent quota
reduction at the population means for all data (a 35.6 kg quota reduction). Using
the results in Table 2, average farm household consumption would be predicted to
have increased somewhat by 15.5 kg, average additions to stocks would be predicted
to have increased by 4.2 kg and average market sales would be predicted to have
increased by 24.8 kg. Assuming for purposes of illustration perfect substitutabil-
ity in quantities between quota wheat and wheat sold through markets, total wheat
made available to urban consumers by this average farmer would have decreased by
10.8 kg. This effect was probably responsible for at least some of the increase in private
market prices experienced, beginning in 1994. It should be noted that to the extent
reductions in wheat quotas provided increased incentives for wheat production, over
time the allocation of the additional wheat to market sales may have offset the impact
of the quota reduction.
As discussed, the market liberalisation reforms of 1992 and 1993 were rolled back in
late1994,inpartbecauseofasubstantialincreaseinprivatemarketprices.Inaddition,
wheat farmers were accused by some of grain hoarding or, in other words, increasing
on farm storage of wheat. The empirical ﬁndings presented here provide insights
about why private market grain prices may have increased even though, paradoxically,
quantities of wheat made available to the private market increased.
5. Conclusion
Grain stocks provide food and income security buffers for Chinese farmers. However,
this study provides evidence that these farmers adjusted wheat stocks during 1994 in
response to changes in government policy and changes in market prices, even in the
short-term. The results reported above indicate that increases in potential revenues
from family members living off the farm led farmers to reduce the share of wheat
allocated to stocks. Opportunity costs associated with wheat stock holding also inﬂu-
enced farm storage decisions in the predicted manner. The Chinese farmers surveyed
responded to increases in market prices in 1994 by allocating a smaller proportion of
wheat to stocks. The share of wheat allocated to stocks increased with wages in the
village. Changes in wheat market prices had a positive effect on consumption shares,
possibly because of offsetting farm revenue and substitution effects, or alternatively
because higher reported wheat prices reﬂect higher wheat quality. Wheat consumption
share decreased with the total amount of wheat available for household allocations
after delivery quotas have been fulﬁlled.
The share of available wheat allocated to market sales by Chinese farmers was
relatively unresponsive to observed changes in reported wheat market prices during
1994. Increases in wheat available to the farm family led to increased market sales
shares. It should be noted, however, that the cross-section nature of the data utilised
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onlypermitsanevaluationofshort-termpriceresponses,aseffectsonwheatproduction
could not be estimated.
Finally, the empirical results provide useful insights into the net effects of changes
in key elements of the government’s grain acquisition program during the early 1990s.
A 10 per cent decrease in the delivery quota for wheat would, on average, increase the
quantity of grain available to farmers at the means by approximately 3 per cent. It
is also predicted to have increased the 1994 average farm household consumption by
approximately 2 per cent, and to have increased average market sales by approximately
4percentduring1994.However,thepredictedincreaseinmarketsaleswereinsufﬁcient
to fully compensate for the reductions in the quantity of quota wheat, effectively
reducing the amount of grain available to urban consumers. Given these ﬁndings, the
increased consumer prices experienced in China during these reforms, the accusations
of farmers hoarding grain and the subsequent reform rollbacks, should have been
anticipated.
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